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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tanya E. White challenges the district court's denial of her motion to suppress her
statements obtained after her unlawful arrest. She argues that law enforcement arrested her
because they handcuffed her, told her they believed she had drugs, frisked her, and took her to
their police cars for questioning. She maintains that this was far more than a mere investigatory
detention. She further argues that her arrest was unlawful because law enforcement did not have
probable cause to allow the arrest. Due to the unlawful arrest, she submits that the district court
should have granted her motion to suppress. Therefore, on this issue, Ms. White respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying her motion, vacate her judgment
of conviction, and remand her case for further proceedings.
Ms. White also challenges the district court's denial of her Idaho Criminal Rule 36
motion to correct a clerical error in the judgment of conviction. Mr. White moved to correct the
written sentence in the judgment because that sentence exceeded the district court's oral
pronouncement. The district court denied her motion. Ms. White asserts that this was in error,
and she respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying her motion
and remand this case for a new judgment of conviction with the correct sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the early afternoon in late December, Deputy Brock approached a passenger in a
parked car in a Walmart parking lot after seeing the car's two other occupants "engaged in
suspicious behavior." (R., p.107.) Deputy Brock had seen these two occupants-the driver,
Robert Mann, and the passenger, Ms. White-exit the car and "watch" him as they went into
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Walmart. (R., p.108.) Then, Deputy Brock saw Mr. Mann exit Walmart, see him, and "go back
inside the store." (R., p.108.) Deputy Brock thought this behavior was "very odd." (R., p.108.)
Upon approaching the parked car, Deputy Brock smelled marijuana. (R., p.108.) Deputy
Brock asked the passenger-Ms. White's adult son Deavan Tristan-why Ms. White and
Mr. Mann "were avoiding him and acting 'all sketchy."' (R., p.108.) Mr. Tristan admitted that
Mr. Mann was "smoking weed," and it was in the trunk. (R., p.109.) Mr. Tristan did not
implicate Ms. White in using or possessing marijuana or any other drug. (R., pp. I 08-09; see
State's Ex. 1, 13:26:04-13:27:35.) During Deputy Brock's questioning of Mr. Tristan, Deputy
Norris and Deputy Ellis arrived at the parking lot for backup. (R., p.109.)
Right after Mr. Tristan's admission, Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis went into Walmart
to find Mr. Mann and Ms. White. (R., p.109; State's Ex. 1, 13:27:35-13:28:22.) Once walking
around in Walmart, Deputy Brock radioed Deputy Ellis that they were playing "cat and mouse"
and "I'm sure they probably grabbed some other stuff and they're probably in the bathroom. I
don't know." (R., p.109; State's Ex. 1, 13:30:55-13:31:03.) Deputy Brock found Mr. Mann and
Ms. White in the middle of Walmart in about seven minutes. (R., p.109; See State's Ex. 1,
13:27:04-13:34: 15.)
Upon seeing Mr. Mann and Ms. White, Deputy Brock said, in a slightly raised voice,
"Hey, Rob, Tanya, come here." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:19-13:34:22.) Mr. Mann and Ms. White
complied and walked to Deputy Brock in the middle of an aisle. (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:2213:34:30.) Deputy Brock told them that he was "not playing cat and mouse anymore, okay."
(State's Ex. 1, 13:34:25-13:34:28.) He ordered Mr. Mann to keep his hands out of his pockets.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:34:24-13:34:31.) He also ordered Mr. Mann to turn around and put his hands
behind his back. (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:31-13:34:35.) Mr. Mann complied. (State's Ex. 1,
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13:34:31-13:34:33.) Deputy Brock handcuffed Mr. Mann. (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:33-13:34:47.)
As Deputy Brock was handcuffing him, Ms. White asked, "What's going on?" and Deputy
Brock told them that they had drugs in their car, they kept walking away from him, and he's not
"an idiot." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:35-13:34:41.) Ms. White did not try to get away from Deputy
Brock or make any furtive movements. (See generally State's Ex. 1, 13:34:19-13:34:57.) Deputy
Brock then told Ms. White, "Put your stuff down. Turn around." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:4713:34:51.) She complied, and Deputy Ellis 1 handcuffed her. (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:49-13:34:59.)
Deputy Brock started walking Mr. Mann out ofWalmart, telling him, "Let's go ... Back to your
car, where you don't want to be." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:57-13:35:01.) Before following Deputy
Brock out of Walmart, Deputy Ellis frisked Ms. White. (State's Ex. 1, 13:35:12-13:35:40.)
Deputy Ellis then followed behind with Ms. White to Mr. Mann's car. (See State's Ex. 1,
13:36:02-13:37:55.) Deputy Ellis held on to Ms. White's arm as he walked her out of the store.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:36:02-13:36:12.)
Once back at the car, Deputy Ellis had Ms. White lean against the front of a police car.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:37:44-13:38:22.) She was still in handcuffs. (State's Ex. 1, 13:37:4413:38:18.) Deputy Brock questioned Mr. Mann by his police car and, a couple minutes later, put
him in the back of his police car. (State's Ex. 1, 13:37:40-13:39:20.) Deputy Ellis then brought
Ms. White to Deputy Brock, and Deputy Brock told her that she was "just being detained" and
gave her Miranda 2 warnings. (R., p.109; State's Ex. 1, 13:39:22-13:39:38.) Ms. White expressed
concern that her son would be arrested, and she said that the marijuana was "just mine."
(R., pp.109-110; State's Ex. 1, 13:39:40-13:41:00.) She also told Deputy Brock that she was on
1

It is not clear from the video precisely when Deputy Ellis met up with Deputy Brock,
Ms. White, and Mr. Mann. However, less than a minute elapsed between Deputy Brock locating
them and Deputy Ellis handcuffing Ms. White. (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:19-13:34:50.)
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

probation. (R., p.110.) Moments later, Deputy Brock discovered that the marijuana belonged to
Mr. Tristan, and Ms. White explained that she said it was hers because she did not want to her
son to get in trouble. (R., p.110; State's Ex 1, 13:41:18-13:45:06.) During this conversation,
Deputy Brock told her that he was probably going to take her and Mr. Mann to jail "for
something simple ... just 'cuz you're making it really difficult." (State's Ex. 1, 13:43:3813:43:47.)
Less than two minutes later, another officer found a purse in the car with a pipe, used
syringes, and a methamphetamine-like substance. (R., p.110; State's Ex. 1, 13:46:58-13:47:05.)
Deputy Brock brought the purse to Ms. White, still handcuffed, and said, "Let's talk about this."
(State's Ex. 1, 13:47:05-13:47:11.) Ms. White answered, "Can you not open that up in front of
my son?" (State's Ex. 1, 13:47:11-13:47:13.) Then, they had the following exchange:
Deputy Brock: Absolutely, I will ... not. Do you want to talk about it?
Ms. White: No.
Deputy Brock: You don't want to talk anymore?
Ms. White: I don't know what there is to talk about, sir.
Deputy Brock: Okay. Is it .. .It's obviously yours, or are we going to deny that
too?
Ms. White: Does it matter what I say at this point?
Deputy Brock: Well, I'm -- I like having conversations and that way I can have a
story to tell instead of saying, well I found this in her belongings ...
Ms. White: It sounds like you think -- you've already got it figured out. So you
might as well wait 'til you find the stuff that we ditched in the store, you know?
Deputy Brock: Did you ditch stuff in the store?
Ms. White: No.
Deputy Brock: Okay ...
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Ms. White: Actually, it doesn't matter what I say, you've got your situation
figured out.
Deputy Brock: Yes, I do.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:47:14-13:47:56; R., pp.110-11.) Deputy Brock told Ms. White that she was
now under arrest for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (R., p.111; State's
Ex. 1 13:48:08-13:48:24.) Deputy Brock asked Ms. White if she knew if the syringes were
"capped," and she said that she did not know because they were not hers. (R., p.111; State's Ex.
1, 13:48:49-13:49:09.) Deputy Brock had Ms. White get in the back of another police car.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:51:14-13:51:17.)
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Ms. White committed one count of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(l).
(R., pp.11-12.) The State also filed a misdemeanor citation for possession of drug paraphernalia,
in violation of LC. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.13-14.) The district court consolidated the cases.
(R., pp.42, 44.) Ms. White waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to
district court. (R., pp.48, 49.) The State subsequently charged Ms. White by Information with
possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.55-56.)
Ms. White filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.58-59.) She argued that Deputy Brock
arrested her when he handcuffed her in Walmart and removed her from the store for questioning
in the parking lot. (R., pp.61-63.) She further argued that the officers had no need to use
handcuffs to detain her and did not have probable cause for her arrest. (R., pp.63-66.) Due to the
unlawful arrest, Ms. White moved to suppress all evidence, including her statements to the
officers. (R., pp.58, 65-66.)
The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.79-97.) First, the State asserted that Ms. White did
not have standing to challenge the search of the car. (R., pp.81-82.) Second, the State argued that
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Deputy Brock only detained Ms. White in Walmart, and he had reasonable suspicion for the
detention. (R., pp.82-86.) The State further argued that Deputy Brock's use of handcuffs to
detain Ms. White was reasonable. (R., pp.84-86.) Third, the State contended that, if Deputy
Brock arrested Ms. White, he had probable cause to arrest her and Mr. Mann for possession of a
controlled substance and frequenting (LC. § 37-2732(d)). (R., pp.86-89.) Fourth, the State
asserted that, if Deputy Brock arrested Ms. White without probable cause, the evidence found in
the car was not the fruit of the illegal arrest. (R., pp.89-92.) Relatedly, and lastly, the State
argued that, if Deputy Brock arrested Ms. White without probable cause, Ms. White's statements
were admissible under the attenuation doctrine. (R., pp.92-96.)
Ms. White replied and clarified that she sought suppression of her statements only.
(R., p.100.) She did not seek suppression of the evidence found in the car. (R., p.100.) She also
argued that Deputy Brock arrested her in W almart, and handcuffs were unnecessary because the
officers had no safety concerns. (R., pp.100-01.) Finally, Ms. White asserted that, even if the
officers had probable cause to arrest her, they only had probable cause to arrest her for two
misdemeanors committed outside the officers' presence (possession of marijuana and
frequenting). (R., pp.101-02.) As "completed" misdemeanors, Ms. White argued that the officers
could not arrest her for these offenses without a warrant under Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. (R., pp.102-04.)
The district court held a hearing on Ms. White's suppression motion. (R., p.105; see
Tr. Vol. I, 3 p.5, L.5-p.7, L.14.) The parties agreed to submit Deputy Brock's bodycam video and
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There are four separate transcripts on appeal, contained in one electronic document titled,
"Transcript Appeal Volume 1 9-19-2019 10.08.42 28690998 FF744EAF-0DBA-40A8-94AD11D257CE1897.pdf." Each transcript is cited separately with reference to its internal pagination.
Citations to "Tr. Vol. I" refer to the motion to suppress hearing, held on April 18, 2019 (pages 1
to 8 of overall electronic document). Citations to "Tr. Vol. II" refer to the motion in limine
6

have the district court make its determination "without any further evidence." (Tr. Vol. I, p.5,
Ls.18-22, p.7, Ls.1-5; see State's Ex. 1.) The State submitted on its brief, and Ms. White
reiterated her argument that Deputy Brock arrested her in Walmart without probable cause and
therefore her statements after her arrest should be suppressed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.6-18.) The
district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.21-22.)
One week later, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order denying
Ms. White's motion. (R., pp.107-120.) The district court determined that Deputy Brock had
reasonable suspicion that Ms. White was or had been engaged in criminal activity based on the
marijuana odor from the car, her recent occupancy in the car, her evasive behavior, and her son's
admission to marijuana in the car. (R., p.114.) The district court also determined that it was
reasonable to detain Ms. White to investigate the marijuana in the car. (R., p.114.) Next, the
district court ruled that Deputy Brock subjected Ms. White to an investigatory detention, not an
arrest, and the use ofhandcuffs was reasonable to prevent the risk of flight. (R., pp.116-17.) On
the investigatory detention and handcuffs, the district court explained:
In this case, it appears to this court that Defendant did not pose a threat to officer
safety but that she did pose a risk of flight. In contrast to [State v. Pannell, 127
Idaho 420 (1995)], where the defendant did not attempt to escape and remained at
the scene, Deputy Brock noticed that Defendant and Mr. Mann appeared to be
avoiding him. Mr. Mann's attempted exit and abrupt return to Walmart is
evidence that Defendant and Mr. Mann posed a risk of flight. Two officers were
present inside a crowded Walmart during the detention of Defendant and
Mr. Mann. Defendant was handcuffed for the duration of her encounter with law
enforcement. The law enforcement purposes of handcuffing Defendant were to
prevent escape into a crowded Walmart and to maintain order while returning
Defendant and Mr. Mann to the vehicle outside. Even if Defendant was
cooperative after being placed in handcuffs that does not necessarily mean that
Defendant did not pose a risk of flight. Thus, Deputy Brook's use of handcuffs

hearing, held on May 30, 2019 (pages 9 to 28). Citations to "Tr. Vol. III" refer to the change of
plea hearing, held on June 3, 2019 (pages 29 to 46). Citations to "Tr. Vol. IV" refer to the
sentencing hearing, held on August 15, 2019 (pages 47 to 60).
7

during the investigative detention of Defendant was reasonable and did not
transform the detention into an arrest under Pannell.
(R., pp.116-17.) Finally, the district court held that, because there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, her statements "were not 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and do not warrant suppression
under the exclusionary rule." (R., p .119.)
About one month later, the State filed a motion in limine, and the district court granted
the State's motion. (R., pp.123-24, 182-83, 184-85, 188; Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.20-p.18, L.1.) A few
days later, Ms. White entered a conditional guilty to possession of a controlled substance
pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. (R., pp.190, 191; Tr. Vol. III, p.13, L.23-p.14, L.1.)
The State agreed to dismissal of the possession of paraphernalia charge. (Tr. Vol. III, p.6, L.22,
p.10, Ls.10-12; see R., pp.195, 197 (motion and dismissal).) Ms. White reserved her right to
appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress and its grant of the State's motion in
limine. 4 (R., pp.209-10, 211; Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.1-5, p.10, Ls.13-17.) The parties agreed to
probation. (R., p.191; Tr. Vol. III, p.10, Ls.9-10.)
At the sentencing hearing, both parties recommended two years of probation, and neither
party requested a specific underlying sentence. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.6, Ls.11-14, p.7, Ls.21-22.) The
district court agreed with the probation recommendation and placed Ms. White on probation for
two years. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.8-10.) For her underlying sentence, the district court stated:
Ms. White, I'm willing to go along with the recommendations that are made, the
agreement that's been made in this case, to impose a sentence but suspend it,
place you on probation. I'm going to impose a three-year prison sentence; first
year will be fixed, next two years will be indeterminate. I'm going to suspend
execution of all of the sentence and place you on probation for a period of two
years.

4

Ms. White does not pursue the district court's grant of the State's motion in limine on appeal.
8

(Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.3-10 (emphasis added); see also Aug. R., ForTheRecord Sentencing
Hearing Recording, 3:38:04-3:38:31.) In conflict with the district court's oral pronouncement,
the court minutes state that the district court said, "I am willing to go along with the agreement. 2
fixed, 2 indeterminate. 2 years supervised probation." (R., p.199.) Similarly, the district court's
judgment of conviction states:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are sentenced to the Idaho State
Board of Correction as follows:

For a total unified sentence not to exceed four (4) years, commencing with
a fixed term of two (2) years, to be followed by an additional two (2) year
indeterminate sentence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the execution of sentence be suspended
for a period of two (2) years, during which time you will be on supervised
probation, upon the terms and conditions set forth below, and the Agreement of
Supervision of which you have been advised.
(R., p.202 (emphasis added).) The judgment of conviction was signed and filed the day after the
sentencing hearing. (R., pp.199, 201, 204.)
Ms. White timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.21517.)
Later, Ms. White filed a stipulated Idaho Criminal Rule 36 ("Rule 36") motion. (Aug.
R., pp.1-2.) She requested that the district court correct her sentence because the district court
orally pronounced a sentence of three years, with one year fixed, but the written judgment
imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (Aug. R., p.1.) The prosecutor had no
objection to the motion. (Aug. R., p.2.) The district court denied the motion. (Aug. R., p.1.) The
district court superimposed its ruling on the motion itself The district court stated:
The court minutes indicate a 4 year unified sentence with two years fixed.
The court listened to the recording of the hearing several times. Judge Carey said
he would impose a suspended sentence of three years with two fixed and the two
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years indeterminate. This court believes he misspoke when he used the words
"three years" and intended a four year sentence.
(Aug. R., p.2.) Accordingly, the district court declined to correct Ms. White's sentence. (Aug.
R., pp.1-2.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. White's motion to suppress when Deputy Brock
and Deputy Ellis arrested her without probable cause?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. White's Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical
error in the judgment?

11

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. White's Motion To Suppress When Deputy Brock
And Deputy Ellis Arrested Her Without Probable Cause
A.

Introduction
Ms. White argues that the district court erred by denying her suppression motion because

Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis arrested her in Walmart without probable cause. Looking at the
totality of the circumstances, Deputy Brock's and Deputy Ellis's actions, especially the use of
handcuffs, transformed any possible investigatory detention into an arrest. Moreover, the
deputies' use of handcuffs was not justified because Ms. White was not a flight risk. Finally,
Deputy Brock did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. White. Due to the unlawful arrest, the
district court should have suppressed Ms. White's subsequent statements as the fruit of her
illegal arrest.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court." Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free review of "the trial court's
application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
"This appeal presents the unusual situation where this Court has exactly the same
evidence before it as was considered by the district court:" Deputy Brock's bodycam video.

State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 312 (2018). "In such instance," the Court does not "extend the
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usual deference to the district court's evaluation of the evidence. 'Under these limited
circumstances, this Court has determined that its role on appeal is to freely review the evidence
and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court would do."' Andersen, 164 Idaho at
312 (quoting State v. Lanliford, 162 Idaho 4 77, 492 (201 7) (evaluating district court's ruling on
motion for new trial)).

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Ms. White's Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Ellis's Use Of Handcuffs, Plus The Other Factors, Amounted To A De Facto
Arrest Of Ms. White That Was Unsupported By Probable Cause
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003); see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. "Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that
'[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886
(2015) (alteration in original). A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the
State shows the seizure fits within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.
Green, 158 Idaho at 886-87; see also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002) ("When a

warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show
that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable."); State v. Hunter, 156
Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). The defense has the burden to prove a seizure occurred.
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004).

Here, there is no dispute that the deputies seized Ms. White; the question is the extent of
the seizure. (See R., pp.112-12, 114-17.) The district court held that Deputy Brock and Deputy

13

Ellis merely conducted an investigatory detention, also known as a Terry5 stop, when the
deputies handcuffed Ms. White in Walmart. (R., pp.114-17.) Ms. White argues, however, that
the deputies' use of handcuffs, along with the other facts in the case, show that the deputies'
actions amounted to a de facto arrest. Along similar lines, Ms. White argues that the district court
erred by holding that she was a flight risk in order to justify the use of handcuffs during the
alleged Terry stop. Further, as a de facto arrest, Ms. White asserts that Deputy Brock did not
have probable cause that she committed a crime and, therefore, her arrest was in violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights. Because Ms. White's arrest was unlawful, the district court should
have suppressed her statements made after her arrest.

1.

The totality of the circumstances, especially the use of handcuffs without any
justification, show that the deputies arrested Ms. White in Walmart

"[T]here is no bright line rule to determine when an investigatory detention has become
an arrest. Instead, 'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria."' State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796 (1998) (quoting State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420,423
(1995)). "[T]his Court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and determine whether
the investigative methods employed were the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify
or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 368
(Ct. App. 1999) (citing Pannell, 127 Idaho 420). To determine if a detention "becomes
unreasonable, the court is to consider: (1) the duration of the invasion imposed by the additional
restriction; and (2) the law enforcement purposes served." State v. Du Valt, 131 Idaho 550, 554
(1998) (citing Pannell, 127 Idaho at 423). "If the investigative detention becomes unreasonable,
the detention is transformed into an arrest." Id. (citing Pannell, 127 Idaho at 423).

5

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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"Factors to be considered in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest
include the seriousness of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the
reasonableness of the officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter
unfolds." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). As for the
display of force, the Court has allowed police officers to use handcuffs in a limited investigatory
detention to address two concerns: officer safety or flight. Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424. In either
situation, the risk must be "substantial." Id. For example, in State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873
(1987), "the substantial risk of imminent violence was readily apparent and justified the officer's
use of 'reasonable force' to maintain the 'status quo."' Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424 (quoting Johns,
112 Idaho at 878). There, a solo officer initiated a traffic stop of "suspected murderer," who
killed the victim with a knife. Johns, 112 Idaho at 877. The officer had seen the suspect remove a
knife from his car before the stop and, upon frisking the suspect, found another knife. Id.
"[T]here was some slight resistance" when the officer removed the second knife. Id. This was
"an extraordinary case" where handcuffs were necessary for the officer's safety. Pannell, 127
Idaho at 424. In contrast, in Pannell, the fact that the defendant "might have posed a threat to the
officers' safety ... was not sufficient to meet the high threshold needed to justify the use of
handcuffs as part of an investigative detention." Id. There, three officers initiated a traffic stop of
one defendant shortly after he left his house. Id. at 421, 424--45. Even though there was a
domestic disturbance report, the warning of weapons in the defendant's house, and an
intoxicated defendant who reached behind the seat of his car, the Court held handcuffs were "a
degree of force" that exceeded its justification. Id. at 424-25. The Court recognized that the
defendant was not physically violent, "fully compliant with the officer at all times," and had no
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weapons on him. Id. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the seizure in Pannell
amounted to an arrest upon the officers' use ofhandcuffs. Id. at 425.
Here, the totality of the circumstances establish a de facto arrest, and the facts are far
more innocuous than even Pannell to justify the use of handcuffs. All of factors-seriousness of
the crime, location, detention length, display of force, and suspect's conduct-weigh towards an
arrest.
First, the suspected crimes were not serious. Deputy Brock smelled marijuana in the car
and learned from Mr. Tristan that Mr. Mann had smoked marijuana that he kept in the trunk.
(R., pp.108-09.) Ms. White was not implicated in this drug activity, but, apparently, she was
guilty by association. Nonetheless, possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor, LC. § 372732(c)(3). Possession of other controlled substances, though a felony, LC. § 37-2732(c)(l), is
far less serious than a crime against another person or property. These are not serious crimes.
Second, the location of the encounter was not isolated, dangerous, or unusual. Deputy
Brock and Deputy Ellis seized Ms. White and Mr. Mann during the day in the middle of a welllit store with another officer waiting in the parking lot, not to mention the Walmart security
guards. (R., p.108; see State's Ex. 1, 14:14:31-14:16:40 (discussion with Walmart security
guards and receipt of contraband hidden by Mr. Mann in bathroom).)
Third, the length of the seizure was not brief Fourteen minutes elapsed between Deputy
Brock ordering Ms. White to "come here" in Walmart and her "formal" arrest. (See State's Ex. 1,
13 :34: 19-13 :34:22, 13 :48:08-13 :48:24.) The detention included separate rounds of questioning
between Mr. Mann, Ms. White, and Mr. Tristan, plus a search of the car and containers inside.

(See State's Ex. 1, 13:37:36-13:48:10) Deputy Brock gave Ms. White Miranda warnings when
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he first questioned her. (State's Ex. 1, 13:39:22-13:39:38.) She was in handcuffs the entire time.
(See State's Ex. 1, 13:37:36-13:48:10.)

Fourth, the display of force in usmg handcuffs was unjustified. The district court
correctly identified no officer safety concerns to justify the use of handcuffs. (R., p.116.)
However, the district court incorrectly determined that Ms. White was a flight risk to warrant the
use of handcuffs. (See R., pp.116-17.) Like the defendant in Pannell, Ms. White "was fully
compliant" with Deputy Brock's commands to "come here," "put your stuff down," and "tum
around." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:19-13:34:22, 13:34:47-13:34:51.) See Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424.
Ms. White remained compliant throughout the encounter. As evidenced by the video, Ms. White
never resisted the deputies or tried to flee upon Deputy Brock's commands. (See State's Ex. 1.)
Moreover, Mr. Mann and Ms. White's supposed game of "cat-and-mouse" with Deputy Brock
before he ordered them to do anything does not establish a flight risk. Such an inference would

deem anyone who, on his or her own accord, fails to approach an officer be a flight risk. That is
absurd. Individuals are not required to walk up to police officers, unprompted, and await further
instructions. Indeed, this Court recently emphasized that individuals have "every right" to avoid
an officer and refuse to speak with him. State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 450 P.3d 315, 322
(2019) ("Even more, an individual exercising their right to refuse to speak with law enforcement,
on its own, is insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.... Padel' s decision not to
speak with Officer Scholten cannot be considered when evaluating reasonable suspicion to detain
Gonzales because Padel had every right to refuse to speak with Officer Scholten."); see also
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (citations omitted) ("The person approached,

however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without
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reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without
more, furnish those grounds."). To be sure, trying to "pull away" from an officer or leaping from
a moving car and fleeing on foot from police would establish a flight risk. Pannell, 127 Idaho at
424 (discussing flight risk examples parenthetically); see State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 884, 889
(Ct. App. 1999) (handcuffs reasonable because defendant had history of violence and "bolted"
upon officers' lawful entry into his home); see also United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131, 142
(1st Cir. 2009) (handcuffs justified because actual fear of armed defendant and defendant fled
during traffic stop with "evasive route"); United States v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 1993)
(handcuffs justified because, along with officer safety concern, defendant "actively evading"
officer and indicated he would try again). But here, Ms. White's conduct was on the other end of
the spectrum: Mr. Mann and Ms. White walked into Walmart, Mr. Mann attempted to exit and
abruptly went back in, and Deputy Brock found them in the middle of Walmart in about seven
minutes. (R., pp.107-08; See State's Ex. 1, 13:27:04-13:34:15.). Again, once instructed by
Deputy Brock to "come here," Ms. White followed all commands. There is nothing in the record
to show that Ms. White was a flight risk to justify the use of handcuffs. The handcuffs were
unreasonable, and this display of force strongly establishes Ms. White's seizure as a de facto
arrest. 6
Finally, Ms. White's conduct throughout the encounter weighs toward an arrest and
against any need for handcuffs. As discussed, Ms. White was "fully compliant," like the
defendant in Pannell. Also similar to Pannell, "there was no indication that physical violence
was involved." 127 Idaho at 424. Moreover, and unlike the report of possible weapons in
Pannell, there was no report of any weapons in this case. In addition, although there were three
6

Along with the display of force in using handcuffs, Deputy Ellis also frisked Ms. White.
(State's Ex. 1, 13:35:12-13:35:40.)
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suspects (Mr. Mann, Ms. White, and Mr. Tristan), there were also three uniformed officers with
two patrol cars, plus Walmart security guards. (R., p.109; see generally State's Ex. 1.) Therefore,
Ms. White's conduct throughout the encounter also shows an arrest.
Looking at all of the surrounding circumstances, Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis's
detention of Ms. White was unreasonable and constituted a de facto arrest. Deputy Brock ordered
Ms. White to stop, put her personal belongings down, and turn around to be handcuffed by
Deputy Ellis. Deputy Brock told her that he suspected her of illegal activity. Once Deputy Ellis
handcuffed her, he frisked her and took her outside for questioning. Considering Ms. White
posed no risk to officer safety and was not a flight risk, the use of handcuffs was unjustified.
"Based on this totality of circumstances," Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis "employed a degree of
force which exceeded that justified for an investigatory detention and which therefore amounted
to an arrest." Pannell, 127 Idaho at 425. The district court erred by ruling the deputies only
conducted an investigatory detention and the use of handcuffs was reasonable. (R., pp.116-17.)
Therefore, Ms. White submits that this Court should hold Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis
arrested her in Walmart.

2.

The deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. White for a crime

An arrest must be based on probable cause to be lawful. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
816 (2009). "[A] warrantless arrest [is] lawful if the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe a felony had been committed or if the offender had committed a misdemeanor in the
presence of the officer." State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451, 454 (2019). 7 "Probable

7

Ms. White recognizes that the Court recently drew a distinction between lawful arrests for
felonies and misdemeanors under the Idaho Constitution. In Clarke, the Court held that Article 1,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed
outside the officer's presence. 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d at 457. In the case at hand, Ms. White
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cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in
believing that the offense has been [or is being] committed." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 816 (alteration
in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Judicial determination of probable cause
focuses on the information and facts the officers possessed at the time." State v. Jenkins, 143
Idaho 918, 921-22 (2007) (citing State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 823 (2004)). "The facts
making up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint." State v.

Islas, 165 Idaho 260, 443 P.3d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2019) (citing State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133,
136 (1996)).
Here, Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. White for
any criminal offense. Although the district court determined that the deputies had reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop, that standard "is 'considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence,' and 'obviously less' than is necessary for probable cause."

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989)). (R., p.112-14.) The objective facts did not establish the more demanding standard of
probable cause for an arrest. At the time of Ms. White's arrest in Walmart, the deputies knew: (1)
Mr. Mann and Ms. White were acting "very odd" and seemed to be avoiding Deputy Brock when
they went into Walmart; (2) Mr. Mann exited Walmart, saw Deputy Brock, and went back in the
store; (3) Mr. Tristan said that Mr. Mann had marijuana in the trunk; (4) there was a marijuana
odor coming from the car; and (5) Mr. Mann and Ms. White were "playing cat-and-mouse" in
Walmart. (R., pp.107-09.) These facts would not lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe
Ms. White had committed a crime at the moment of her arrest in Walmart. Importantly, the
deputies did not locate marijuana in the car until after Ms. White's arrest. Ms. White's allegedly

asserts that the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest her for any offense, including a
misdemeanor.
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"very odd" behavior of going into Walmart with another person who had smoked marijuana,
coupled with her exercise of her right to avoid the officer, is insufficient to establish probable
cause of Ms. White's commission of any criminal offense. At best, the deputies had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity due to Ms. White being in the car with Mr. Mann, but the deputies
could not arrest her simply for her association with him. Therefore, Ms. White argues that the
deputies unlawfully arrested her because they did not have probable cause.

3.

Due to Ms. White's unlawful arrest, the district court should have suppressed her
statements

The exclusionary rule requires suppression at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 71 7, 720 (201 7) (citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471,485 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004))

The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both "primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure" and, pertinent here,
"evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality," the
proverbial "'fruit of the poisonous tree."' Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
804 (1984); accord, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).
Id. Although statements can be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the same statements may

be subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590,601 (1975). That is because "[t]he exclusionary rule, ... when utilized to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the
Fifth. It is directed at all unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that happen to
produce incriminating material or testimony as fruits." Id.
For example, in Wong Sun, the Court suppressed the defendant Toy's statements after his
unlawful arrest. 371 U.S. at 484-86. Upon the police's unlawful entry into Toy's residence, Toy
fled, and the police unlawfully arrested him in his bedroom. Id. at 474-75. Toy then made
incriminating statements. Id. at 475. The Government argued that Toy's statements were
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admissible, "although closely consequent upon the invasion which [the Court held] unlawful, ...
because they resulted from an intervening independent act of a free will." Id. at 486 (quotation
marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Toy's
statements were the "fruits" of the officers' unlawful action. Id. at 484, 486. According to the
Wong Sun Court, the Government's argument took "insufficient account of the circumstances.

Six or seven officers had broken the door and followed on Toy's heels into the bedroom where
his wife and child were sleeping. He had been almost immediately handcuffed and arrested." Id.
at 486. "Under such circumstances," the U.S. Supreme Court held, "it is unreasonable to infer
that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion." Id.
Subsequent cases have clarified the appropriate test to determine whether statements
made during an illegal arrest are subject to the exclusionary rule. In Brown, the police unlawfully
arrested the defendant, took him to the police station, gave him Miranda warnings, and
questioned him. Id. at 593-94. The defendant made incriminating statements. Id. at 594-96. The
U.S. Supreme Court first explained that the Miranda warnings "alone and per se, cannot always
make the act sufficiently a product of free will be break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the
causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case
that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited." Id. at 603. Rather, the
Miranda warnings are "an important factor," but not the only one. Id. The Court must also

consider the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statements, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Id. at 603-04. The
burden to avoid application of the exclusionary rule rest with the State. Id. at 604. Applying this
test, the Brown Court suppressed the defendant's confession: "less than two hours" separated his
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arrest and his first statement, there were "no intervening event of significance whatsoever," and
the police purposefully engaged in illegal action "in the hope that something might tum up." Id.
at 604-05.
A few years later, in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed a situation that was ''virtually a replica of the situation in Brown." Id. at 218. In
Dunaway, like Brown, the police unlawfully seized the defendant, took him to the police station,
gave him Miranda warnings, and questioned him. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203. The defendant
''waived counsel" and made incriminating statements. Id. As in Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court
suppressed the defendant's statements. Id. at 218-19. The Dunaway Court was unpersuaded by
the fact that the police "did not threaten or abuse" the defendant ("putting aside his illegal seizure
and detention") and that the police met the threshold to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights. Id. The Court concluded, "To admit [the defendant's] confession in such a case would
allow law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the
knowledge that they could wash their hands in the procedural safeguards of the Fifth." Id. at 219
(quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Lastly, Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court once agam
suppressed the defendant's statements made after Miranda warnings. Id. at 633. There, the police
unlawfully seized the defendant from his home in the middle of the night, handcuffed him, and
took him to the police station. Id. at 628. The defendant confessed after ten to fifteen minutes. Id.
at 628-29. The U.S. Supreme Court noted, since the defendant was unlawfully arrested, "wellestablished precedent requires suppression of the confession unless that confession was 'an act of
free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."' Id. at 632-33 (quoting
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486). The Dunaway Court determined that all factors, except the giving
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of Miranda warnings, pointed to suppression. Id. at 633. No "substantial time" passed between
the illegal seizure and confession, some officers knew "they lacked probable cause to arrest," and
the State alleged no intervening event. Id.
In line with Wong Sun, Brown, Dunaway, and Kaupp, Ms. White's statements 8 must be
suppressed as they were obtained by exploitation of her illegal arrest. Although Deputy Brock
gave her Miranda warnings about five minutes after her illegal arrest, those warnings did not
cure the Fourth Amendment violation. If those warnings "were held to attenuate the taint of an
unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment
violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted." Brown, 422 U.S. at
602 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-727 (1969)). The "incentive" created by the
exclusionary rule "to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making
warnings, in effect, a 'cure-all,' and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and
seizures could be said to be reduced to 'a form of words."' Id. at 602-03 (citing Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)). As such, Deputy Brock's Miranda warnings to Ms. White did not
purge the taint of her illegal arrest to avoid suppression of her statements.
Further, no other factor weighs in the State's favor. First, about five minutes separated
Ms. White's illegal arrest and her statement about marijuana, and less than fifteen minutes
separated her arrest and her statement about not opening the purse in front of her son. (State's
Ex. 1, 13:34:49-13:34:59, 13:39:40-13:41:00, 13:47:11-13:47:13.) "Such a short period of
time" between the illegality and the statements "weighs in favor of suppression." Cohagan, 162
8

The main incriminating statement was Ms. White's request for Deputy Brock not to open the
purse in front of her son, which arguably showed her knowledge of its contents. (R., p.118;
State's Ex. 1, 13:47:11-13:47:13.) However, Ms. White argues, as she argued below, that all
statements, even if not incriminating on its face, are subject to suppression. (R., p.100.) See
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487 (rejecting the Government's argument that Toy's statements should
be admissible because "they were ostensibly exculpatory rather than incriminating")
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Idaho at 722 (applying Brown factors to discovery of arrest warrant during otherwise illegal
arrest).
Second, there were no intervening circumstances. Nothing broke the causal chain
between Ms. White's illegal arrest and her statements. Unlike the discovery of an arrest warrant,
where the officer is judicially mandated to arrest the defendant, the discovery of drugs in the car
driven by Mr. Mann did not "mandate" Deputy Brock question Ms. White. See Cohagan, 162
Idaho at 722 ("the discovery of the outstanding warrant, independent of the stop, compelled
Cohagan's arrest"). Although Deputy Brock was certainly free to question her, he was not
compelled to do so. More importantly, had Ms. White not been unlawfully arrested, she may not
have made the statements. She would have been able to leave or, if not handcuffed and
confronted by the deputies, Ms. White may have felt free to ignore the questions altogether,
invoke her Miranda rights, or give different responses. Her statements "flowed directly from"
her illegal arrest, State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017), without any intervening, "entirely
unconnected" factor, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016). This factor weighs in favor of
suppression.
Finally, the third factor of the purpose and flagrancy of the deputies' misconduct also
weighs in Ms. White's favor. Deputy Brock and Deputy Ellis did not have probable cause to
arrest Ms. White, yet they handcuffed her, frisked her, and took her back to the parking lot for
questioning. The use of handcuffs was completely unjustified because the deputies had no
legitimate basis to believe Ms. White was a flight risk. Ms. White had the right to go about her
business in Walmart unless and until the deputies ordered her to do otherwise. Moreover, Deputy
Brock's actions were purposeful. He pursued Mr. Mann and Ms. White after seeing them being
"all sketchy." (R., p.108.) He had them handcuffed and taken back to the car "where you don't
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want to be." (State's Ex. 1, 13:34:57-13:35:01.) Once in the parking lot, Deputy Brock gave
Ms. White Miranda warnings, even though he said that she was "just being detained." (State's
Ex. 1, 13:39:23-13:39:39.) He told her that she put her son in a "real shitty position." (State's
Ex. 1, 13:39:53-13:40:03.) After discovering the marijuana belonged to Mr. Tristan, he told her,
"But the fact that you and, um, your boyfriend all know that stuffs in there, I'm probably going
to take you guys to jail for something simple just 'cuz you're making it real difficult." (State's
Ex. 1, 13:43:41-13:44:47.) Deputy Brock was convinced they "ditched" something in Walmart
and was going to keep them there until he found it. (State's Ex. 1, 13:43:45-13:44:50.) The
deputies' conduct in arresting Ms. White without probable cause was purposeful and flagrant.
This final factor weighs toward suppression.
Ultimately, Ms. White's statements were not "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
primary taint" of her illegal arrest. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. Ms. White made the statements
during her illegal arrest, and no intervening event broke the "causal chain such that" her
statements were "sufficiently attenuated" from the deputies' illegal action. Downing, 163 Idaho
at 30-31. If her statements are not suppressed, "[a]rrests made without warrant or without
probable cause, for questioning or 'investigation,' would be encouraged by the knowledge that
evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expendent of
giving Miranda warnings." Brown, 422 U.S. at 602. Ms. White submits that her statements are
subject to the exclusionary rule as the result of the Fourth Amendment violation. Therefore, she
maintains that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
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The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. White's Rule 36 Motion To Correct A Clerical Error
In The Judgment
A.

Introduction
Ms. White argues that the district court erred by denying her Rule 36 motion because the

district court's written judgment of conviction contained a clear clerical error. The district court's
judgment incorrectly imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed, but the district
court's oral pronouncement was for a sentence of three years, with one year fixed. If there is any
disparity between the oral and written sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. Therefore, the
district court should have granted Ms. White's motion to correct the error in the judgment.

B.

Standard Of Review
Undersigned counsel was unable to locate any authority from the Idaho appellate courts

on the standard of review for the district court's denial of a Rule 36 motion. The federal circuit
courts, however, review the trial court's denial of a motion to correct a clerical error de novo.
See, e.g., United States v. Vanderhorst, 927 F.3d 824, 826 (4th Cir. 2019) ("Whether a district

court properly denied a defendant's motion for relief under Rule 36 is a question oflaw that this
Court reviews de novo."); United States v. Davis, 841 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2016) ("A
district court's application of Rule 36 is reviewed de novo."); United States v. Mackay, 757 F.3d
195, 197 (5th Cir. 2014) ("We review the district court's final order denying Mackay's Rule 36
motion de novo because the facts are undisputed, leaving only questions of law."); United
States v. Burd, 86 F.3d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As this case hinges entirely on the application

of Rule 36 to the undisputed facts, we review the propriety of the district court's order de
novo."). Ms. White submits that this Court should adopt a de novo standard of review for the
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district court's denial of a motion to correct a clerical error because these errors are clear from
the face of the record. See State v. Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 932 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Ms. White's Rule 36 Motion Because The
Written Judgment Does Not Contain The Same Sentence As The Oral Pronouncement
Idaho Criminal Rule 36 states in full: "After giving any notice it considers appropriate,

the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record,
or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission." I.C.R. 36. Idaho appellate
court have repeatedly recognized that a motion pursuant to Rule 36 is appropriate mechanism to
correct a disparity between the defendant's sentence in district court's oral pronouncement and
its written order. See, e.g., State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008); Wallace, 116 Idaho at
932.
If there is any disparity between the district court's oral pronouncement and written

order, the oral pronouncement controls. See, e.g., Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782; State v. McCool,
139 Idaho 804, 806 n.1 (2004). The oral pronouncement controls because "[t]he legal sentence
consists of the words pronounced in open court by the judge, not the words appearing in the
written order of commitment." Wallace, 116 Idaho at 932 (citing United States v. Bergmann, 836
F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 878 (Ct. App. 2007)
(same). "Although a written judgment is presumably a correct statement of the judgment
pronounced in open court, ... the principle remains that the only legally cognizable sentence in a
criminal case is the 'actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant."' Wallace, 116
Idaho at 932 (quoting Bergmann, 836 F.2d at 1221). A Rule 36 correction "may be made where
sufficient information appears in other parts of the record, or in official records kept at the time
of the proceeding, to show that a mistake, clerical in nature, has been made." Id. (citing State v.
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Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83 (1982); State v. Storey, 109 Idaho 993, 712 P.2d 694 (Ct. App. 1985);
Robinson v. State, 407 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. App. Div. 1981)).
Here, the district court erred by denying Ms. White's Rule 36 motion because the district
court's written sentence differed from its oral pronouncement. The transcript of the sentencing
hearing clearly shows that the district court orally pronounced a sentence of three years, with one
year fixed. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.6-8.) Consistent with the transcript, the audio recording of the
sentencing hearing contains the district court pronouncing the same sentence of three years, with
one year fixed. (Aug. R., ForTheRecord Sentencing Hearing Recording, 3:38:17-3:38:23.) This
sentence controls. The court minutes and the judgment do not. See Wallace, 116 Idaho at 932
("The transcript in any case certified by the reporter shall be deemed prima facie a correct
statement of the testimony taken and the proceedings had." (citing I.C. § 1-1105; State v.
Salazar, 95 Idaho 305, 507 P.2d 1137 (1973); State v. Ruddell, 97 Idaho 436 (1976)). As such,
the written sentence of four years, with two years fixed, was a clerical error. The district court
should have granted Ms. White's Rule 36 motion and reduced her written sentence to three
years, with one year fixed.
The district court's denial of Ms. White's motion was contrary to the well-established
principle that the oral pronouncement controls. Upon listening to the recording of the hearing,
the district court stated, "Judge Carey said he would impose a suspended sentence of three years
with two fixed and the two years indeterminate. This court believes he misspoke when he used
the words 'three years' and intended a four year sentence." (Aug. R., p.2.) Yet nothing in
transcript or audio recording indicates the district court misspoke and transposed "three" with
"four" for the total sentence. Again, the district court stated at sentencing:
Ms. White, I'm willing to go along with the recommendations that are made, the
agreement that's been made in this case, to impose a sentence but suspend it,
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place you on probation. I'm going to impose a three-year prison sentence; first
year will be fixed, next two years will be indeterminate. I'm going to suspend
execution of all of the sentence and place you on probation for a period of two
years.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.3-10 (emphasis added).) As evidenced by the transcript (and the audio
recording), this is not a situation where the district court misspoke. The district court never stated
that it was imposing a sentence of three years with two years fixed and two years indeterminate.
And, the district court did not make any other statements to indicate a mix-up between the actual
and intended sentence. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, L.3-p.13, L.18.) The district court unequivocally
imposed a sentence of three years, with one year fixed. There was no misstatement in the district
court's oral pronouncement of Ms. White's sentence. 9

9

Even if the district court "misspoke," the district court was still bound by its unambiguous oral
pronouncement at the sentencing hearing. In Allen, the Court held that the district court erred by
entering an amended judgment "to reflect what the court described as its true intent at
sentencing." 144 Idaho at 877. The Court explained, "This was impermissible ... because the
sentence in the amended judgment does not comport with the sentence pronounced upon Allen at
the sentencing hearing." Id. The Court further held that the district court's reference to Rule 36
for its authority to amend the sentence was in error:
We conclude . . . that Rule 3 6 does not provide a vehicle by which a trial court
may amend a sentence to give effect to the court's previously unstated intent that
alters the sentence. In State v. Phillips, 99 Idaho 354, 355 (1978), our Supreme
Court held that I.C.R. 36 does not apply to judicial errors involving the exercise
of discretion, as the rule "permits correction of clerical errors but not judicial
errors." See also State v. Griffith, 140 Idaho 616, 618 (Ct. App. 2004). A clerical
error in typing a written judgment that directly conflicts with an orally
pronounced sentence can be corrected by the trial court at any time under I.C.R.
36, State v. Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83, 84 (1982); Wallace, 116 Idaho at 932, but
Rule 36 is not "a vehicle for the vindication of the court's unexpressed sentencing
expectations, or for the correction of errors made by the court itself " United
States v. Robinson, 368 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 2004). See also United States v.
Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342,
347--48 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 264-65 (7th Cir.
1993). We therefore are constrained to hold that the district court had no authority
to enter the amended judgment that substantively altered Allen's sentence, and it
is of no effect.
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In sum, the district court erred by denying Ms. White's Rule 36 motion to correct the
clerical error in the sentence in the judgment of conviction. She respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the district court's order denying her Rule 36 motion and remand this case for the
district court to enter a new judgment of conviction with the corrected sentence.

CONCLUSION
Ms. White respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence to the
district court's oral pronouncement or remand this case for the district court to enter a new
judgment of conviction with the corrected sentence.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2020.
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Id. at 878 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Ms. White's "original sentence, as pronounced
at [her] sentencing hearing," controls. Id.
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